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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In 1846, American forces crossed the Nueces River and entered into a section of
disputed territory north of Mexico.  The Mexican War is significant for several reasons. 
First, it exemplified America’s willingness to engage in an offensive military venture on
foreign soil against a sovereign nation.  Second, the success of the war reinforced the
concept of Manifest Destiny–that by divine right, the United States should expand its
territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.  Third, the Mexican War increased
sectional strife due to immense territorial gains, which in turn upset the delicate balance
between free and slave states.  In this sense, the Mexican War can be considered an
indirect cause of the American Civil War.  Finally, the Mexican War gave practical
military training and combat experience to numerous veterans who later fought in the
Civil War.  
Although the Mexican War was relatively short (1846-1848), the Americans faced
considerable difficulty in achieving success.  Some of the key battles, especially those in
northern Mexico, were “near misses.”  The capture of Monterrey and the Battle of Buena
Vista are prime examples.  American regular soldiers were mainly responsible for the
army’s success in the first two battles of the war (Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma).  But
for the remainder of the war, volunteer soldiers played an important role in assuring
2American success.  This was especially true in the northern campaigns led by General
Zachary Taylor, General John Ellis Wool, and Colonel Alexander Doniphan.  Volunteer
units accompanied Taylor to Monterrey and contributed greatly to that city’s capture. 
Volunteer units contributed equally to the United States Army’s monumental victory at
Buena Vista.  Beyond their contributions to the pitched battles of northern Mexico,
volunteers assisted in the transport of goods, the occupation of cities, and the pacification
of guerrillas and civilians.  
The civilian population of Mexico was not exempt from the sufferings faced by
both the Mexican and American armies.  The presence of volunteer units had a
significantly adverse effect on the inhabitants of northern Mexico throughout the conflict. 
American volunteers serving in the United States Army during the Mexican War—many
of them motivated by a thirst for adventure, and at times, personal
vengeance—committed numerous atrocities against the civilians and non-combatants of
northern Mexico.  Two factors explain why such incidents occurred.  First, the volunteers
and their respective units were often beyond the control of the formal military discipline
imposed upon army regulars.  This military discipline, for the most part, espoused
conciliation and proper treatment of Mexican civilians and non-combatants.  Second,
continuous harassment from guerrillas and irregular Mexican troops created frustrations
among American volunteers that resulted in retaliatory actions, often
directed—intentionally or unintentionally—at Mexican civilians and non-combatants. 
This situation was unique to the American army’s northern campaign, and several first-
hand accounts serve as evidence to the undisciplined nature of volunteer units and the
3atrocities that resulted.  A study of such behavior demonstrates that the Mexican War,
despite its brevity, affected the civilians of northern Mexico in ways common to
numerous other wars. 
The significance of historical events is subject to differing interpretations, and the
Mexican War is no exception.  There are five main interpretive schools relative to the
war.  One interpretation adheres to the theories of “slavocracy,” “slave power,” and
sectional interests.  In other words, southern slave holders were responsible for instigating
a war of territorial acquisition to expand the institution of slavery.  A second
interpretation attributes the war to western and New England commercial interests.  A
third interpretation focuses on the United States’ desire for territorial expansion,
commonly referred to as Manifest Destiny.  Manifest Destiny fostered patriotism by
relating to the popular religious and ideological sentiments of 1840s America.  A fourth
interpretation accuses one specific person for the commencement of hostilities:  President
James K. Polk.  A final interpretation deals with this question:  Who was ultimately
responsible, the United States, Mexico, or both?1
Traditional Mexican War accounts focus on the causes and consequences of the
war.  Attempting to understand the consequences often involves placing the war within
the context of later events, such as the American Civil War.  Other accounts are written
from an exclusively military perspective; they deal primarily with battlefield strategy and
logistics.  In dealing with the war, these accounts highlight civilian and military
leadership, key battles, and the sufferings of soldiers.
4In 1919, Justin H. Smith (1857-1930) completed his two-volume work entitled
The War with Mexico.  His research involved an examination of some 100,000
manuscripts, 120,000 books and pamphlets, and 200 periodicals.   His final analysis2
opposes prior assumptions of Mexico’s “innocence” and the United States’ unbridled
aggression.    In Mexico, Smith explains, “The press clamored for war; the government
was deeply committed to that policy; and the great majority of those who counted for
anything...were passionately determined that no amicable and fair adjustment of the
pending difficulties should be made.”   Smith’s scholarly inquiry and arguments3
culminated with his receiving the 1920 Pulitzer prize for the best study in American
history.
Smith’s conclusions countered the earlier ones of the nineteenth-century
American historian Hubert H. Bancroft (1832-1918).  In the fifth volume of his History of
Mexico, published in 1885, Bancroft covers the Mexican War.  In reference to the
conflict, Bancroft states that “it was a premeditated and predetermined affair, the war of
the United States on Mexico; it was the result of a deliberately calculated scheme of
robbery on the part of the superior power.”   Obviously, his conclusion portrays Mexicans4
as innocent victims, and he does not hesitate to blame the war on land-hungry and pro-
slavery Americans, whom he openly castigates with derogatory references.
In 1974, K. Jack Bauer presented a more balanced interpretation in his book The
Mexican War:  1846-1848.  Bauer portrays the war as one that was highly unpopular
among American citizens, and he mentions the often overlooked difficulties that plagued
the American army.  Bauer finds it “difficult to envision any set of circumstances which
5would have prevented an effort to add Mexico’s northern regions to the American
commonwealth.”   Mexico stood in the way of American interests; therefore, war was5
inevitable.  Adding to traditional interpretations that connect the resulting sectional strife
to the American Civil War, Bauer adds that “[the war’s] effects in Mexico were nearly as
great.”   He concludes that the conflict with Mexico “was the product of the conjunction6
of American and Mexican national aspirations brought together by the miscalculations of
the leaders of both countries.”   Bauer believes the Mexican War resulted from a conflict7
of interests and lack of communication on both sides.  In addition, the war helped to
increase sectional strife present in both countries.8
Published in 1975, Mexico Views Manifest Destiny, 1821-1846 offers perspectives
on the origins of the Mexican War.  Relying on Mexican sources, author Gene M. Brack
examines the emergence of anti-American sentiment throughout the two decades
preceding the war.  During this time, Mexican admiration for American institutions was
undermined by what many Mexicans considered to be threats to their national
sovereignty.  Mexican anxiety centered on America’s desire to expand territorially; this
represented a direct threat to Mexico’s control of its northern territories.  With the
admission of Texas to the United States in 1845, Mexico’s fears were confirmed, and as a
result, Mexico’s leaders were willing to confront the United States.  Brack’s belief is that
when the Mexicans were “left with the choice of war or territorial concessions, the former
course, no matter how dim the prospects of success, could be the only one.”   In addition9
to Mexico’s growing resentment and fear of the United States, Brack also attributes the
war to America’s racist attitudes (Brack asserts that “Manifest Destiny was itself an
6ethnocentric notion”).   Brack’s presentation of Mexican public opinion proves the10
existence of specific apprehensions and resentments–directed at the United States–which
increased the level of antagonism and ultimately led to the commencement of hostilities.   
   To understand the war within a broader context, it is necessary to include its
impact on Mexican society.  Writing a social history of the Mexican War, therefore,
requires that adequate attention be given to civilians.  Rather than asking who was
responsible for the war, a social perspective probes into the consequences, and ultimately,
the impact of the war on society.
In A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair:  Soldiers and Social Conflict During the
Mexican-American War, Paul Foos documents the war’s impact on both soldiers and
civilians.  Rather than rehashing the well-known events of the war, he highlights the
lesser-known conflicts that involved guerrillas, civilians, and soldiers–both volunteers
and regulars–that occurred beyond the field of battle.  Foos mentions numerous atrocities
committed upon the civilians of northern Mexico in Chapter Six, “Atrocity:  The Wage of
Manifest Destiny.”   Overall, A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair offers solid suggestions for11
the reasons that civilians suffered throughout the war.  Foos accomplishes this by citing
from the diaries and memoirs of Mexican War participants.  Especially noteworthy are his
perspectives on the motivations of American volunteers in the war, and how this affected
their behavior during their time in northern Mexico.  
Army of Manifest Destiny:  The American Soldier in the Mexican War, 1846-
1848, is an in-depth social history about the lives of soldiers who fought in the war. 
Author James M. McCaffrey also includes numerous references to the behavior of
7American soldiers and their subsequent impact on Mexican society.  Chapter Five,
“Reptiles in the Path of Progressive Democracy,” deals with American racism (i.e., the
description of Mexicans as “reptiles”) and how this contributed to civilian abuse.  12
Throughout the remainder of the book, McCaffrey portrays the trials and tribulations of
individual soldiers in a foreign land and how these circumstances fostered atrocious
behavior on the part of regular and volunteer soldiers alike.
Irving W. Levinson’s Wars Within War:  Mexican Guerrillas, Domestic Elites,
and the United States of America, 1846-1848 also informs the reader of lesser-known
conflicts and circumstances that adversely affected both soldiers and civilians.  This
account is especially helpful in understanding the frustrations that American soldiers
faced in their quest to control both the civilian population and Mexican guerrillas.  This
frustration manifested itself in numerous atrocious acts perpetrated by select members of
the United States Army against Mexican civilians.  It also reinforces the notion that the
war was not easily won; in reality, the war was a prolonged event that was won both on
and off the fields of the better-known pitched battles.  By focusing on those Mexicans
who worked with the United States (elites), as well as those who opposed their
conquerors (guerrillas), Levinson portrays the Mexican War as a complicated event,
composed of various competing factions and interests.  His realistic approach shows how
Mexican society was affected from both within and without.13
The participants and observers of the Mexican War composed numerous journals,
diaries, memoirs, dispatches, and narratives, many of which have been published.  In
many of these first-hand accounts, there appears to be a concerted effort to conceal
8civilian atrocities or such incidents that would portray the United States military in a
negative light.  For example, many of the journals from the Doniphan expedition focus
exclusively on the military exploits and bravery of Colonel Alexander Doniphan and his
Missouri volunteers.  According to such authors, the Mexican civilians who complied
with the American forces received fair and just treatment.  The researcher is left to
wonder if indeed the Missourians were master conciliators or simply unwilling to
acknowledge any negative impact their presence may have had on Mexican society. 
However, it is important to remember that Doniphan and the Missourians faced less
resistance than did other American campaigns of the war.  Also, the civilians of this part
of Mexico (Santa Fe and El Paso) were more familiar with Americans and American
society.  Many of these Mexicans, suffering years of persecution at the hands of hostile
Indians and bandits, welcomed the Americans as their new protectors.  When viewed
from this perspective, the journals and memoirs of the Doniphan expedition appear to be
credible.  14
The campaign of General John Ellis Wool is detailed in these two contrasting
accounts:  Francis Baylies’s A Narrative of Major-General Wool’s Campaign in Mexico
and Jonathon W. Buhoup’s Narrative of the Central Division.  Baylies writes a very
positive and romantically-inspired account of the journey from San Antonio to Saltillo,
Mexico.  However, his praise of General Wool is not unfounded; other sources allude to
Wool’s successful administration of justice and discipline throughout his service in the
war.  Buhoup’s narrative, on the other hand,  refers to numerous accounts of civilian
atrocities and plunder.  However, he fails to include the names of any of the perpetrators. 
9Instead, he uses the term “Indian” to signify any individual or group (or himself, maybe?)
guilty of unjustified plunder, murder, or torture.  Buhoup was one of several Arkansas
volunteers who comprised Wool’s division.  His use of the term “Indian” allowed him to
report the misdeeds of Arkansans and other volunteers without divulging the guilty
parties involved.15
American volunteers inflicted the most damage on Mexican society throughout
the campaign of General Zachary Taylor.  Nearly every account of the army’s
movement–from the Rio Grande to the battle of Buena Vista–mentions the
insubordination and lawlessness of the Texas Rangers.  Their mistreatment of Mexican
civilians and wanton plundering overshadowed their distinguished military service.  The
Rangers’ behavior cast all volunteer units in a negative light, and also contributed to
strained relations with otherwise peaceful civilians.  While other volunteer units were
guilty of similar behavior, evidence suggests that the Texas Rangers participated in more
acts of cruelty than any other single group of military personnel.  
The accounts of officers, army regulars, volunteers, war corespondents, and army
surgeons all provide valuable information relating to daily life in northern Mexico during
the war.  Depredations against civilians were very much a part of daily life.  The memoirs
of Samuel Chamberlain contain the most graphic and detailed descriptions of volunteer
excesses.   Although some of his accounts are obviously exaggerated, Chamberlain’s16
status as an army regular helped him to write a more objective account of the various
volunteer units and their respective behavior.  Equally revealing were the recollections of
army surgeon S. Compton Smith.  In Chile con Carne, Smith gives detailed descriptions
10
of vicious guerrilla warfare and its effects upon American troops, Mexican irregulars, and
civilians.   The misdeeds of volunteers also appear throughout the correspondence and17
memoirs of such military leaders as Zachary Taylor, Winfield Scott, Ulysses S. Grant,
George B. McClellan, and George G. Meade.  
Collectively, these accounts prove the prevalence of atrocities committed by the
Mexican War volunteers against civilians during the conquest of northern Mexico. 
Although depredations were not necessarily restricted to any one particular group of
volunteers, the atrocious actions of the Texas Rangers and the Arkansas volunteers
(Rackensackers) exceeded those of other units.   Chapter Two recounts specific atrocities18
committed by the Texas Rangers throughout the war, and also explains their reasoning
and motivation behind such behavior.  Chapter Three is a general study of the volunteer
units that served under General Zachary Taylor’s northern campaign.  It exposes specific
instances of violence perpetrated by volunteers against the civilian inhabitants of northern
Mexico from the volunteers’ arrival in Matamoros, through the occupation of Monterrey,
and during the first half of 1847.  Chapter Four focuses exclusively on the Arkansas
volunteers serving under General John E. Wool.  Wool’s division traveled from San
Antonio to Saltillo, Mexico, in the fall of 1846.  Throughout the march and the
subsequent occupations of Monclova and Saltillo, the Arkansas volunteers behaved in an
atrocious manner only exceeded by the Texas Rangers.  Their depredations were many,
and the punishments they received few.  This study exposes the effects that Mexican War
volunteers had on the inhabitants of northern Mexico.   
11
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CHAPTER II
A MISSION OF VENGEANCE:  THE TEXAS RANGERS IN NORTHERN MEXICO
On December 6, 1847, the citizens of Mexico City greeted a company of Texas
Rangers with shouts of “Los Diablos Tejanos!”   S. Compton Smith, a United States1
Army surgeon who served in the Mexican War, described the Texas Rangers as “very
devils incarnate.”   Such derogatory and extreme references require explanation.  During2
their military service in northern Mexico, the Texas Rangers tortured and killed civilians,
destroyed property, stole from locals, and blatantly disregarded military authority.  While
other volunteer units and army regulars occasionally committed similar atrocities, the
Texas Rangers’ behavior deviated from the norm.    
Compared to other volunteer units that served in the Mexican War, the Texas
Rangers shared a more extensive history with Mexico.  This violent and conflicted past
instilled many Rangers with hatred of and prejudice against Mexicans.  The Rangers
retained these feelings when they entered northern Mexico in 1846.  Their primary
mission was vengeance; this motivated them more than any allegiance to the cause of the
United States and its armed forces.  
Mexican War diaries and memoirs give first-hand descriptions of the  Rangers’
participation in the conflict.  By far, Samuel E. Chamberlain’s My Confession and S.
Compton Smith’s Chile con Carne provide the researcher with the most thorough
15
accounts of the Rangers’ involvement.  In addition to these, General Zachary Taylor’s
letters contain several references to the behavior and attitudes of the Rangers. 
Native Texan Walter Prescott Webb probably contributed more to the study of the
Texas Rangers than any other scholar.  In his Master’s thesis, “The Texas Rangers in the
Mexican War,” he glosses over specific atrocities committed by the Rangers during the
northern campaign.  Although he included a few of Taylor’s comments concerning the
Rangers’ unruly behavior and mistreatment of citizens, Webb generally praises the
Rangers’ military accomplishments.  In his conclusion, he states, “They were the most
daring and picturesque set of fighting men in all Mexico.”   In The Texas Rangers:  A3
Century of Frontier Defense, Webb devotes several pages to the Rangers in the Mexican
War.   He reiterates many of his earlier conclusions.  Webb writes from a military4
perspective, and his works fail to mention most of the atrocities committed by the
Rangers during the Mexican War.
There are several recent publications that deal with the Rangers’ participation in
the Mexican War.  In The Highly Irregular Irregulars, Frederick Wilkins utilizes a
wealth of primary sources, many of which Webb failed to consult.   Wilkins tells his story5
from a military perspective; but unlike Webb, he does not hesitate to mention the specific
acts of the Rangers.  He describes his book as “neither whitewash nor hero worship.”   In6
A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair, Paul Foos mentions numerous Ranger atrocities as well.  7
Although restricting his treatment of the subject to a few pages, he mentions detailed
events that involved Ranger injustices.  By utilizing a wide variety of sources, Wilkins
16
and Foos prove that the Rangers caused considerable social conflict in northern Mexico
during the war.    
The first written reference to “ranger,” as it applies to Texas, occurred in 1823. 
Stephen Austin, acting independently of the Mexican authorities, called for the special
services of ten men to act as rangers.   They were to aid an existing militia attachment. 8
At this point in history, “ranger” implied a body of men who operated apart from the
regular military establishment, and whose tasks included scouting and reconnaissance
missions.   In the Mexican War, the role of the Rangers reflected Austin’s original intent.9
On January 26, 1842, the Texan Congress, sensing a Mexican threat, passed a
joint resolution.  It established a “company of mounted men, to act as rangers on the
southern frontier.”   This new organization, created to assist and supplement local10
militias, became the Texas Rangers.    
On March 5, 1842, Mexican forces commanded by General Rafael Vasquez
invaded Texan territory.  Thomas J. Green, a Texas politician and veteran of the Texas
Revolution, claimed that “the plunder of San Antonio by General Vasquez, on the 6th of
March, 1842, met a response in the bosom of every patriot Texian [sic].”   On April 1, an11
army of five thousand Texans assembled under the command of General Edward
Burleson.  Before the Texan militia reached San Antonio, Vasquez’s army evacuated the
city and retreated to the Rio Grande.  The Texans did not pursue.  Soon after this,
Burleson and most of the citizen-soldiers returned to their homes.12
Hostilities between Texas and Mexico continued into the fall of 1842.  On
September 11, a Mexican army under the command of General Adrian Woll entered San
17
Antonio.  The Mexicans encountered slight Texan resistance and suffered only minimal
casualties.  On September 16, a group of Rangers commanded by Captain John C. Hays
successfully lured Woll and his troops out of the city.  The Mexican army engaged the
Texans and suffered significant casualties.  At this point, Woll decided to pursue another
company of Rangers commanded by Captain Nicholas M. Dawson.  13
The fate of Dawson’s company contributed greatly to the Rangers’ animosity
toward Mexicans.  In the ensuing conflict, the Mexican artillery overwhelmed Dawson’s
small company.   According to Green — after the Texans had surrendered and given up14
their weapons — the Mexicans killed thirty-six, spared fifteen, and allowed two to
escape.   Of the Texans taken prisoner, several were “inhumanly butchered with swords15
and lances.”   Green concluded, “Not only the officers... [but] the whole Mexican nation16
are responsible for this outrageous and savage butchery...but a day of retribution will
assuredly overtake them, terrible though just.”   Many other Texans shared in Green’s17
outrage.  Such an event led to increased Texan resentment of Mexican nationals.  This
provided further justification for the Rangers’ atrocious behavior during the Mexican
War.
Green described a “law of retaliation,” to which he believed the Texans, at this
point in their history, had not yet resorted.   This policy demanded equal retribution for18
each atrocity inflicted from one side to the other.  He believed this policy worked to
prevent “the excesses of an enemy.”  Green cited the aftermath of the Battle of San
Jacinto as evidence.  In that instance, the Texans spared the life of Mexican General
Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.  They did this in spite of Santa Anna’s past slaughter of
18
Colonel James Fannin and four hundred Texan soldiers at Goliad on March 27, 1836. 
Lamenting the failure of Texans to live up to this policy, Green stated, “What has the
reverse of this policy benefitted us?  It has been, for the last seven years, an unlimited
license for our enemy to plunder and murder!”   Throughout the Mexican War, the19
Rangers often resorted to Green’s “law of retaliation.”  In most instances, however, the
actions of the Rangers failed to resemble any form of equal retribution for past injustices.
S. Compton Smith, in reference to an anticipated fight between Rangers and
Mexican guerrillas near Monterrey in December 1846, said, “We remembered the affair
of Mier; and had resolved to fight to the last man, and, should it be necessary, share the
fate of the little band of heroes of the Alamo.”   Mier and the Alamo, in relation to this20
particular event, occurred four and ten years earlier, respectively.  This statement suggests
that the Rangers, while participating in the Mexican War, were motivated by specific
events in their recent past.
The Mier Expedition resulted from Mexico’s two invasions of Texas.  With the
official permission of Texan President Sam Houston, General Alexander Somervell led
750 Texans to the border town of Laredo, Texas, on December 8, 1842.   Their time in21
Laredo, however, proved to be short-lived.  On December 19, Somervell ordered
abandonment of the mission.   Four hundred members of the expedition, including22
notable Ranger leaders Ben McCulloch and John C. Hays, returned home with Somervell. 
The remaining three hundred crossed the border into Mexico and attacked the town of
Mier.  However, the immediate arrival of Mexican troops sealed the fate of the Texans. 
19
The Texans surrendered with the understanding that they would be treated as prisoners of
war and kept near the northern border of Mexico.23
The prisoners marched to Matamoros and then Monterrey.  By early February
1843, they were one hundred miles west of Saltillo at the Hacienda Salado.   On24
February 11, Ranger leader Samuel Walker and several Texans managed to escape into
the vast wilderness between Saltillo and the Rio Grande.  Before the Mexicans recaptured
them, five died of starvation, four reached Texas, and three disappeared; the remainder
returned to Salado as prisoners.25
Mexican President Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna originally decreed that all
prisoners be shot.  This did not happen.  Green, in the Journal of the Texian Expedition
Against Mier, describes the fate of the prisoners.   The Mexicans determined that every26
tenth man would be shot.  One hundred and fifty-nine white beans were placed in a pot
with seventeen black ones.  Each prisoner drew a bean.  The white signified exemption,
and the black death.  With a hint of irony, Green pointed out that the executioners were a
company of Mexican soldiers “whose lives had been so humanely spared by our men at
this place on the 11  of February.”th 27
As noted earlier by S. Compton Smith, the Rangers remembered both the Alamo
and the Mier Expedition while fighting for the United States in the Mexican War.  The
treatment of the Mier prisoners, more than anything, gave justification for the subsequent
atrocities the Rangers committed against both Mexican soldiers and civilians.  Two
notable survivors of the “Black Bean Incident” — Rangers Big Foot Wallace and Samuel
20
Walker — returned to Mexico with the United States Army during the war.  In The Texas
Rangers:  A Century of Frontier Defense, Walter Prescott Webb concludes, “In justice it
must be said that the scores, if not perfectly balanced, were made less unequal by them
and their comrades in 1846 and 1847.”       28
The Texas Rangers were most active in the north Mexican campaign commanded
by General Zachary Taylor.  From 1846-1847, the Rangers participated as loosely
organized soldier-scouts for the main army that traveled southwest from Matamoros to
Saltillo.  Many of the Rangers serving under Taylor were former prisoners of the Mier
expedition.  For these individuals, the United States’ declaration of war was an
opportunity to avenge past sufferings and deaths perpetrated by Mexicans.  Nowhere is
this better exemplified than in the words of a famous Ranger song:  “Spur! Spur in the
chase, dash on to the fight - Cry vengeance for Texas!  And God speed the right.”29
Soon after the United States annexed Texas, President James K. Polk sent Taylor
and a small army to the mouth of the Rio Grande.  Taylor and his army arrived on St.
Joseph’s Island, off the coast of Texas, on July 25, 1845.     On August 6, the Secretary30
of War asked Taylor to “learn from the authorities of Texas what auxiliary forces,
volunteers” were available for service in any future conflict with the Mexicans.   31
On April 15, 1846, Taylor wrote to the Adjutant General in Washington, D.C.:  “I
shall authorize the raising of two companies of Texas mounted men, for service in this
quarter, particularly for the purpose of keeping open our communication with Point
Isabel.”   By this time, Taylor’s army had moved inland and established itself across32
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from Matamoros, Mexico on the Rio
Grande.  The coastal city of Point
Isabel served as the United States
Army’s supply depot.  Taylor
needed the Rangers to escort his
supply trains between the two
points.  
On April 24, 1846, Mexican
cavalry crossed the Rio Grande and
engaged sixty-three American
dragoons.   The Mexicans killed33
sixteen Americans and captured the
survivors.   In response to this34
incident, United States President James K. Polk issued his justification for war by stating,
“Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory, and shed
American blood upon American soil.”   Two days later, Taylor proposed to call upon the35
Governor of Texas and request four regiments of volunteers — two mounted and two
infantry.   After this, the Rangers joined the United States Army in significant numbers36
and served throughout the northern campaign.  
The “shedding of American blood on American soil” by an enemy no doubt
shocked and disturbed many Americans.  The Texans, on the other hand, had experienced
Figure 2 A Texas Ranger during the Mexican War.  John
Frost, A Pictorial History of Mexico and the Mexican War
(Richmond, VA:  Harrold & Murray,1848).  
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similar incidents throughout their history.  Most likely, many Rangers viewed the
skirmish on April 24  as a continuation of their long and troubled history with Mexico. th
The Rangers were fighting to avenge their past — as Texans — and defend their future —
as Americans.  In the case of the Rangers, a quest for historical vengeance and state
loyalty exceeded any allegiance to the army they served.
The Rangers served as scouts and escorts for the United States Army as it traveled
from Matamoros to Monterrey during the late summer of 1846.  On June 30, Taylor
expressed regret for “outrages committed by the Texas volunteers on the Mexicans and
others” but acknowledged his inability to contain what he referred to as a “lawless set.”  37
Taylor believed that if the Texans could be made subordinate, they would be among the
best volunteer units under his command.   But he concluded that they were “too38
licentious to do much good.”   Despite his reservations, Taylor readily accepted the39
services of the Rangers throughout his campaign.  He needed them to counter the
guerrilla war the Mexicans waged after the defeat of their regular army.  Taylor
overlooked the Rangers’ imperfections because they were a valuable asset; they were
willing and able to do what his regular cavalry could not.                  40
The Rangers helped the United States Army capture Monterrey in September
1846.  Interestingly enough, many of the Rangers’ three-month enlistments expired before
the actual battle took place.   Ranger Buck Barry was among those Rangers, but he41
continued the journey because “some of us had traveled six hundred miles to kill a
Mexican and refused to accept a discharge until we got to Monterrey where a fight was
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waiting for our arrival.”   Soon after the Americans subdued the city, the Rangers began42
to display the type of notorious behavior that overshadowed their contributions to the war
effort.  
Mexican War participants singled out the Texas Rangers as one of the primary
sources of fear among the Mexican civilians.  S. Compton Smith cited evidence of this in
his memoirs.  In December 1846, Smith and eight other military personnel attended a
fandango in the small town of San Francisco, near Monterrey.  Smith described their
reception by the villagers as “hearty and warm.”  However, the festive mood of the dance
subsided with the arrival of a dozen Rangers.  Smith explained the great fear the
Mexicans held regarding the Rangers.  He attributed this to their rough handling of
Mexicans before and during the war.  But this occasion proved to be exceptional.  The
festive atmosphere eventually returned to the fandango.  Smith’s account shows that the
Mexicans, overall, were contemptuous and fearful of the Rangers; this was the direct
result of the Rangers’ behavior — on and off the field of battle.43
Smith best illustrated Ranger animosity towards Mexicans in his description of a
Texan volunteer named Connelly.  According to Smith, this soldier had lost three
brothers — all killed prior to the war by Mexicans in Texas.  In Chile con Carne, Smith
stated, “Connelly’s hatred towards the entire Mexican people was naturally intense.  This
had led him to enlist; and he gladly hailed the present as a good opportunity to revenge
his murdered brethren.”   This “opportunity” occurred while Connelly defended an army44
supply train.  Despite the Americans’ success at the Battle of Buena Vista, bandits and
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guerrillas roamed northern  Mexico in significant numbers.  One such group attacked
Connelly’s wagon train in early March 1847.  So intense was Connelly’s hatred that he
ran — armed only with several stones — headlong into a company of lancers and
managed to kill two or three before the Mexicans stopped him.   45
Smith did not mention Connelly’s status as a Texas Ranger.  “Texan volunteer”
does not necessarily signify “Texas Ranger.”  However, given the fact that the Rangers
were exclusively assigned to the defense of army supply trains, it is likely that Connelly at
least had contact with them.  In any case, it is certain that the average Ranger had much in
common with Connelly.  Because of this, there is reason to believe that many Texas
Rangers similarly shared a hatred for Mexicans.  Although Connelly’s behavior was
extreme, it exemplified the contempt that some Texas volunteers, including Rangers, held
for Mexicans.  This incident also proves that many Rangers participated in the war to
avenge their troubled and violent history with Mexicans.
Smith described the Rangers as “such an assemblage of extraordinary and
eccentric characters…men from all ranks and conditions of society.”   He also noted46
educated individuals, such as doctors and lawyers, among the ranks of the Rangers.  47
However, Smith’s overall analyses adhere to popular notions and stereotypes associated
with the Rangers.  He described young men who sought to escape “artificial society,” and
in so doing, developed the necessary survival skills required in a time of war.   In48
reference to a few Rangers, Smith hinted at a troubled and violent past; he suggested they
came to Texas to escape justice.   Individual backgrounds aside, most of the Rangers49
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came from an unsettled and violent frontier.  This common background was instrumental
in the development of Ranger units.  During the Mexican War, it served to unify the
Rangers into a highly-identifiable group; a group characterized by a penchant for violent
and atrocious attacks on the general population of northern Mexico.
Smith divided the Rangers into two groups.  He identified the “first Rangers” as
the veterans of the north Mexican campaign.  Smith acknowledged their participation in
every battle from Palo Alto (May 8, 1846) to Buena Vista (February 22-23, 1847).  Many
in this group also fought for Texan independence.  Smith had nothing but praise for these
Rangers.  But he described another group of “so-called Rangers.”  He noted their later
entry into Mexico, soon after formal military operations ended.  According to Smith, they
“were mostly made up of adventurers and vagabonds, whose whole object was plunder.”  50
Under the leadership of the infamous Mabry B. “Mustang” Gray, these Rangers
committed acts of needless violence that prolonged the conflict in northern Mexico.
On February 24, 1847, Mexican guerrillas attacked an American army supply
train.   In My Confession, Samuel Chamberlain described a most horrifying and51
unbelievable scene following the Mexican submission of the train.  He estimated that the
Mexicans destroyed 130 wagons and killed 110 teamsters.  In response, Taylor assessed
one million dollars in damages to the inhabitants of Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas.   52
To secure these reparations, Chamberlain claimed that General Taylor “let loose
on the country packs of human bloodhounds called Texan Rangers.”   Throughout the53
summer of 1847, Rangers and guerrillas alike terrorized the citizens of these two Mexican
26
states.  Atrocities committed included murder, plunder, and rape.  According to
Chamberlain, “The names...will always remain fresh in the memory of the Mexicans, as
the fearful atrocities committed by them now form part of the Nursery Legends of the
country.”54
In his correspondence, Taylor referred to a brutal massacre that occurred in the
area of the February 24 supply train attack.  He noted that on March 28, 1847, a party
composed of Texas Rangers and others attacked a small town and put twenty-four men to
death.   Chamberlain recounted a similar incident at the San Francisco Ranch.  He placed55
the blame on a group commanded by the notorious Mustang Gray.  He claimed that
Rangers murdered thirty-six unarmed Mexican men and burned several houses.              56
Chamberlain’s memoirs offer further insight into the reasons for such behavior. 
He attributed Ranger leader Mustang Gray’s ferocity to a particular incident from his
childhood.  According to Chamberlain, Gray witnessed the murder of his parents and the
violation of his only sister at the hands of General Antonio Canales and his gang. 
Canales, the most sought after of all Mexican guerrillas throughout the Mexican War,
supposedly committed these atrocities in 1840.  If this account of Gray’s youth is
accurate, it offers a plausible explanation for his behavior.  This indicates that Gray’s
primary mission in the war was to inflict vengeance upon the Mexicans.57
One of Taylor’s most trusted scouts, Captain Ben McCulloch, shared sentiments
similar to those of Mustang Gray.  Samuel C. Reid was a Louisiana native who joined
McCulloch’s Ranger company at the beginning of the war.  In The Scouting Expeditions
27
of McCulloch’s Texas Rangers, Reid described the primary objectives for a
reconnaissance mission in June 1846.  The Rangers were supposed to find the best route
from Matamoros to Monterrey, and if possible, locate the Mexican forces under the
command of General Mariano Arista.  Beyond this, the Rangers sought to capture the
“Chaparral Fox” – the nickname of General Canales.  Canales and his men continually
harassed the American supply trains.  Reid claimed that “to strike the ‘chaparral fox’ in
his own hills – slaughter his band...was a thing above all others McCulloch desired to
do.”   58
As was common on these missions, the Rangers mixed their own personal goals
with those of the United States Army.  While Taylor also desired Canales’s capture, his
primary focus was defeating the Mexican army.  The Rangers’ search for old enemies
sometimes caused them to stray from their mission.  In the desolate wilderness of
northern Mexico, free from army discipline, the Rangers avenged past and present
injustices on their own terms.
Many American soldiers entering Mexico were ignorant of the Catholic faith.  59
However, they held deep-seated prejudices and opinions regarding Catholicism; this was
the result of anti-Catholic rhetoric found in popular literature, histories, and second-hand
accounts of the time.   Many soldiers equated Catholicism with anti-republicanism.  60 61
Sentiments such as these worked to justify any disrespect or abuse shown to Catholic
institutions.  These types of derogatory attitudes, prevalent throughout the United States
before and during the war, contributed to violent and atrocious behaviors directed at
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Mexican religious institutions.  In northern Mexico, American volunteers, including
Texas Rangers, were responsible for such incidents on numerous occasions.
Chamberlain recalled a disturbing incident involving a Ranger at the Hacienda de
Patos, a short distance from Saltillo.  One late afternoon, an army supply train escorted by
Rangers camped outside the small community.  For unknown reasons, one of the Rangers
remained in town, indulging himself in mescal.  The drunken man entered a church and
lassoed a wooden crucifix.  He then proceeded to mount his horse and ride around the
plaza, dragging the image of Christ roughly along the ground.  The village priest,
attempting to salvage the crucifix, fell down and was trampled under the Ranger’s horse. 
The enraged observers eventually subdued the Ranger and brutally flayed him. When the
other Rangers saw their nearly-dead companion, they charged into the square “with yells
of horror...sparing neither age or sex in their terrible fury.”  News of the incident reached
General John E. Wool, but according to Chamberlain, the army kept the matter quiet for
the sake of its reputation.62
Frank S. Edwards, a member of Colonel Alexander Doniphan’s Missouri
volunteers, recalled an encounter with a Texas Ranger near the end of the northern
campaign in May 1847.   The Ranger introduced himself as John Smith, and told63
Edwards that he and his fellow Rangers subsisted by coercing Mexican locals to provide
necessary food and material goods.   According to Smith, when the Rangers needed64
something they would “start off to some rich hacienda...and tell the proprietor that in half
an hour [they] must have so much of provisions.”   If the hacienda owner failed to65
comply, Smith claimed that the Rangers would lasso the owner’s neck and temporarily
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suspend him from a tree, and “after a few such swings, he soon provides what we have
called for.”   After listening to this account, Edwards asked, “Who can wonder at the66
Mexican becoming a guerrilla?”                67
Edwards accused the Rangers of murdering Mexicans who helped the United
States Army.  He recalled instances where Mexican guides–hired out to Ranger scouting
parties–never returned from their missions because “the Texians [sic] always shoot
[them] on some pretext or other before [they get] back.”  Edwards cited as evidence a
particular story he had heard.  A group of Texas Rangers had lost their way and hired a
Mexican to lead them to their camp.  Upon arrival at the camp, one of the Rangers
murdered the unsuspecting Mexican.  Mexican civilians, friendly or otherwise in their
contact with the Texas Rangers, were in many instances needlessly murdered.  To some
Rangers, murder of Mexicans resembled some form of recreation.  Edwards told how the
Rangers “drew lots” to decide who should shoot the guide.68
Backtracking over Taylor’s path of conquest, Edwards noted the destructive
tendencies of the Texas Rangers.  He attributed their behavior to the fact that many of
them had been former prisoners in Mexico, or perhaps injured in past skirmishes before
the war.  The Rangers “spare none, but shoot down every one they meet.”  Edwards
described the road from Monterrey southward as being littered with the remains of
thousands of dead Mexicans.  To Edwards, the Rangers were little more than
“desperados.”  After witnessing the execution of an accused guerrilla, Edwards “turned
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from the scene sickened at heart.”  He claimed that the Rangers’ accusations were
unfounded, and fabricated to justify the killing of an innocent Mexican.                    69
By the end of May 1847, Taylor  appeared to lose patience with volunteer units,
especially the Texas Rangers.  While expressing regret for his volunteers’ atrocious
actions, he readily admitted his inability to control their behavior.  Due to deficient
numbers of regular forces, Taylor was unable to contain the Mexican guerrillas and
insubordinate troops that roamed the countryside.   In regard to the Texans, Taylor70
clearly distinguished between the volunteer infantry and the Rangers.  He claimed that the
Rangers “scarcely made one expedition without unwarrantably killing a Mexican.”  71
Taylor relocated the remaining Rangers to Saltillo, in hopes that they would cause no
more problems.  Although the war was far from over, he formally requested that no more
Texan troops be sent to northern Mexico.72
Both during and after the war, Chamberlain encountered Texans who refused to
answer to any form of civil or military discipline.  The atrocious actions of these
individuals were far more severe than any such incidents committed by the average
Mexican War volunteer or Texas Ranger.  Chamberlain described a Texan named John
Glanton.  Glanton served as a “free scout” during the war for Texan independence.  He
was known to scalp anyone–Mexican and Indian alike–who fell victim to him. 
Chamberlain stated that “any other man in Texas would have been lynched...[but] his
services in the Mexican and Indian wars, made him respected by the masses and gave him
strong friends of men in power.”  During the Mexican War, Chamberlain considered
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Glanton a “free Ranger,” who was always “hanging around our army without belonging
to it, often going out with scouting parties but always independent of all authority.”  This
special status, no doubt, allowed him to inflict any manner of suffering upon the civilian
population of northern Mexico during the war.  Glanton was loyal only to himself, as
evidenced by his service to the famous Mexican guerrilla leader General Jose Urrea at the
end of the war.73
Certain Texans associated with the Rangers remained in Mexico after the war and
continued to plunder and violate the inhabitants of the former Mexican territories. 
Chamberlain accompanied a group of “Scalp Hunters” from Monterrey to California in
the fall of 1848.  In addition to John Glanton, Chamberlain also spent time with a Texan
named “Judge” Holden.  Chamberlain accused Holden of raping and murdering a ten-
year-old girl in the town of Frontreras.  While Chamberlain and Holden were in
Frontreras, Glanton and ten others spent five days “scalp hunting.”  The expedition turned
into a bloody fiasco for the “Sonorans” (Mexicans) whom Glanton encountered.  Glanton
and his men attacked the Sonorans’ camp by night, killing and scalping three men as well
as “three of the women, who being old and ugly were knocked on the head.”  All
valuables in the camp were plundered, and two young women were taken captive and
repeatedly raped and later “brained.”  Glanton later sold the scalps of several Mexicans to
their fellow countryman, General Urrea, who failed to discriminate between Mexican and
Apache scalps.              74
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The actions of “Judge” Holden and John Glanton document civilian atrocities and
depredations that continued well after the close of the war.  The Mexican War allowed
selected Texan volunteers to reap the benefits of material plunder and satisfy their desire
for vengeance and bloodlust.  These volunteers were beyond the control of the American
military both during and after the war.  The success of the United States Army in the
Mexican War allowed groups such as the Texas Rangers to gain a foothold in the newly-
acquired territories of northern Mexico.  Although plundering of the inhabitants of these
territories occurred in the years leading up to the war, the war itself increased the
likelihood that foreigners like the Texas Rangers would remain in Mexico after the war
for the sake of adventure and material gain.         
The Texas Rangers were well known for their brutality throughout the Mexican
War.  Taylor confirmed the Rangers’ consistent insubordination and reckless behavior on
several occasions.  Diaries and other contemporary sources cite numerous instances of
civilian atrocity and property damage perpetrated by the Rangers.  Volunteer and regular
army troops were sometimes guilty of similar behavior.  However, evidence proves that
the Texas Rangers participated in more acts of cruelty than any other single group of
army personnel.
Texas existed as an independent country for nine years; but even after the United
States annexed Texas in 1845, Texans maintained their identity and autonomy.  Under the
guise of fighting for their new country, the Texas Rangers terrorized the inhabitants of
northern Mexico during the war.  The Rangers were a valuable asset to the United States
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Army; for this reason, the military commanders did little to stop the Rangers’ destructive
behavior.  This unique circumstance allowed the Texas Rangers to use the Mexican War
as a means to avenge past wrongs inflicted upon them by Mexicans.    
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CHAPTER III
A PATH OF DESTRUCTION–MATAMOROS TO MONTERREY
Four months elapsed between the war’s initial two battles and the capture of
Monterrey.  The victories at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma allowed the Americans to
cross the Rio Grande and begin the conquest of northern Mexico.  The summer of 1846
was a time of preparation for the American army.  Aside from establishing a secure
supply line inland to Monterrey, the main concern facing the army was its size.  With the
official declaration of war, the United States Government called for volunteers.  S.
Compton Smith, referring to his country’s anticipation of the Mexican War, stated, “The
American people were aroused by the familiar sound, and war!—war! Was on every
tongue, and in every ear.”   Smith explained that war enthusiasm went beyond mere1
patriotism.  He described a generation of Americans eager to experience war for
themselves, and motivated by a “spirit of enterprise and curiosity.”   Patriotic fervor led2
to the formation of numerous volunteer units from all over the country; quotas were easily
filled, and in many instances, exceeded.  But most volunteers were ill-prepared for war. 
Their initial enthusiasm and patriotism quickly subsided when they arrived in northern
Mexico.
          After the American victory at Resaca de la Palma on May 9, 1846, volunteer troops
began arriving at Matamoros, which had surrendered peacefully on May 18.   In his3
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Figure 3  This illustration of  “The Young Volunteer” conveys the patriotic fervor that swept through the
United States at the beginning of the Mexican War.  Motivated by such sentiments,  Americans volunteered
for the war in great numbers.  Time-Life Books, The Mexican War (Alexandria, VA:  Time-Life Books,
Inc., 1978).  Original lithograph by Nathaniel Currier, presumably on the eve of the war.     
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 correspondence, Lieutenant Napoleon Dana recorded the arrival of some six hundred
volunteers on the afternoon of May 24.   This created a unique set of circumstances for4
the army regulars, many of whom had been in the field for several months.  Regulars
were solely responsible for American success in the first two battles of the war.  Proud of
their accomplishments, they did not look forward to sharing their battlefield success with
any newcomers.  Lieutenant George G. Meade expressed concern over the competence of
the volunteers.  “I fear our volunteers,” he lamented, “will not only prove inefficient...but
will prove a serious obstacle to our efficiency....I fear the glory we have acquired at the
Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma will be somewhat dimmed by our apparently tardy
operations succeeding them.”   Dana “heartily” wished the volunteers would return home;5
in his mind, the American regulars had successfully subdued the enemy and needed no
help.   Beyond this, the presence of volunteers threatened the internal harmony and6
stability of the American camp–something that the army regulars had worked so hard to
create.  But the arrival of volunteers would do more than create competition and
disruption within the camp.  The undisciplined nature of the Mexican War volunteer had
its greatest impact upon the civilian inhabitants of northern Mexico.                        
The sudden influx of volunteers into the Matamoros camp was a cause for
concern to both the American regulars and Mexican civilians.  Many army regulars, like
Meade,  resented the arrival of volunteers.  He described them as a “disorderly
mass...perfectly ignorant of discipline, and most restive under restraint,” who would
create “more trouble than the enemy.”   Dana’s initial impressions of the volunteers were7
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negative as well.  He described them “as [a] perfectly used-up set of fellows as you ever
saw, completely broken down and disgusted.”   Meade was worried that the misbehavior8
of volunteers would strain relations between the army and civilians.  The volunteers’
behavior, he feared, would cause the Mexican civilians “to rise en mass [sic] [and]
obstruct our progress.”    The newly-arrived volunteers created immediate disturbances9
within the American camp and the city of Matamoros.  
Volunteers entering Matamoros often became drunk and unruly, committing
atrocities on the Mexican citizens.   These offenders were usually retained in10
guardhouses, which according to Meade, were filled on a daily basis.   Crimes among11
volunteers often exceeded drunken and disorderly conduct.  In his correspondence,
Lieutenant Ulysses S. Grant wrote: 
Since we have been in Matamoras [sic] a great many murders have
been committed, and what is strange there seems to be but very
weak means made use of to prevent frequent repetitions.  Some of
the volunteers and about all the Texans seem to think it perfectly
right to impose upon the people of a conquered City to any extent,
and even to murder them where the act can be covered by the dark. 
And how much they seem to enjoy acts of violence too! I would
not pretend to guess the number of murders that have been
committed upon the persons of poor Mexicans and the soldiers,
since we have been here, but the number would startle you. 12
The behavior of the volunteers was well known back home in the United States. 
In his memoirs, General Winfield Scott stated that “reliable information reached
Washington, almost daily, that the wild volunteers as soon as beyond the Rio Grande,
committed, with impunity, all sorts of atrocities on the persons and property of
Mexicans....”   The problem was that volunteers, overall, were not subject to the same13
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measure of discipline as the regular troops stationed along side them.   Scott explained14
that there were no legal measures on record by which to punish the offenses of
volunteers; he further noted the absence of “any court for the trial or punishment of
murder, rape, theft...no matter by whom, or on whom committed.”   In an attempt to15
restore discipline among the volunteers, Scott drew up an elaborate document titled
“Martial Law Order.”   The Secretary of War William B. Marcy refused to approve the16
order, saying it was “too explosive for safe handling,” and General Zachary Taylor
sarcastically dismissed it as another of “Scott’s Lessons” or “Novels.”   In the absence17
of courts, offending volunteers were generally sent to New Orleans where, in the absence
of witnesses, they were released on habeas corpus, and thus, rarely punished.   Scott’s18
“Martial Law Order” was not published until much later in the war.   As a result, those in19
command of the “Army of Occupation” in northern Mexico failed to control the behavior
of the volunteers throughout 1846.        
With the American occupation, Matamoros quickly became “Americanized.”  20
Trains of sutlers (American merchants who followed the army) provided regulars and
volunteers alike with goods from home, although often at incredible prices.  Theater
companies performed for troops; one such actor described the audience (most likely
composed of volunteers) to which he performed as “the most motley that ever filled a
theater.”   Meade attributed the misbehavior of volunteers to the other forms of21
entertainment found within Matamoros.  Among these were grog-shops, gambling-
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houses, and an abundance of liquor. 
He hoped that upon leaving town, the
absence of these diversions would
help to restore and maintain discipline
and order.22
By the end of June 1846,
Meade’s fears concerning the
volunteers and Mexican civilians
came to fruition.  He believed that a
force of fifteen thousand regulars
would be capable of marching to
Mexico City and successfully
conquering it.  He did not believe,
however, that it would be possible
with a force mainly composed of
volunteers.  He explained that the
regulars had been trained to wage war
against the Mexican army and
government–not the civilians. 
According to Meade, the volunteers,
within a month of their arrival, had already “commenced to excite feelings of indignation
Figure 4  American regulars serving in the Mexican War
were highly-trained and disciplined.  K. Jack Bauer, The
Mexican War:  1846-1848 (New York:  Macmillan, 1974). 
Original painting by H. Charles McBarron.    
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and hatred in the bosom of the
people, by their outrages on them.” 
Volunteers destroyed crops by
allowing their horses to roam freely
in farmers’ fields.  They dismantled
fences for use as firewood.  Innocent
persons continued to suffer at the
hands of drunken volunteers.  Texans
arriving in Matamoros continued to
hold grudges against Mexicans, and
used this to justify their outrageous
behaviors.  All of these offenses,
Meade believed, severely threatened
a successful invasion of the Mexican
interior.   23
From early on, Meade and
other army regulars recognized that
one of the keys to American victory
depended upon restraining the
volunteers and convincing them to treat the civilians in a humane manner.  In many ways,
the misbehavior of the volunteers represented as great a threat to the American army as
Figure 5  Mexican War volunteers were easily
distinguished from army regulars due to their less formal
military attire.  John Taylor Hughes, Doniphan’s Expedition
(College Station:  Texas A&M University Press, 1997).          
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did the Mexican army.  But due to the small size of America’s standing army, volunteer
services were deemed necessary throughout the war.  American regulars withstood
Mexican resistance north of the Rio Grande, but as the army moved inland toward
Monterrey, the value of volunteers was more easily perceived.  This fact, however, did
not mean that the overall behavior of the volunteers improved.
Seventy miles upriver from Matamoros was the town of Reynosa.  At the request
of the mayor, who offered the city’s surrender for a guarantee of protection from Mexican
army stragglers and rancheros, Taylor sent four companies of infantry, a section of
artillery, and a group of Texas Rangers to occupy the city in June 1846.   Ranger Samuel24
Reid explained, “our orders were most strict not to molest any unarmed Mexican.”  He
went on to note, however, that any “villains” found dead were assumed to have
succumbed to suicide.   Soon after this, Ben McCulloch’s company of Rangers spent the25
Fourth of July holiday indiscriminately killing and eating the locals’ pigs and chickens,
all the while drinking whiskey.  They justified this slaughter by joking that the animals
had wandered into their line of fire as they discharged their guns in celebration.  Rather
than allow the meat to go to waste, they cooked and ate it immediately.26
In some instances, the volunteers’ interactions with Native Americans contributed
to civilian discontent.  In August 1846, Comanche Indians raided the town of Mier,
killing several of the inhabitants and taking others as prisoners.  American commanders,
considering it their duty to protect Mexican civilians, commanded a force of Texas
Rangers to pursue the retreating Comanches.  Contrary to their orders, the Rangers
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ultimately refused to take any actions against the Comanches.  Instead, the Rangers
claimed the Comanches as allies in their fight against Mexico.  Meade claimed that
unnamed American citizens incited this particular Comanche raid.  He alluded to an
unspecified peace treaty, supposedly made between Americans and Comanches. 
Apparently, certain Comanches understood the treaty to mean that the United States
would support any action they took against the Mexicans–civilian or otherwise.   27
The expulsion of the Mexican army from the territories north of Monterrey gave
the Comanches more liberty to plunder the unprotected inhabitants of these areas.  Meade
felt it essential to protect civilians from such actions.  He believed that any alliance with
the Comanches–traditional enemies of the Mexican people–would further incite ill
feelings toward the American army.  On the other hand, American willingness to protect
Mexican lives and property would foster popular support for the Army of Occupation. 
The previous incident involving the Rangers exemplifies an inconsistency in policy,
partially brought about by contrary attitudes and insubordination on the part of volunteers. 
Under such circumstances, Mexican civilians found little reason to trust American
volunteers.       28
The Mexicans distinguished between American regular troops and volunteer units. 
Writing from Matamoros, Meade explained, 
“You will hear any Mexican in the street descanting on the good
conduct of the ‘tropas de ligna’ as they call us, and the dread of the
‘volontarios.’  And with reason, [the volunteers] have killed five or
six innocent people walking in the streets...they are always
drunk...they rob and steal the cattle and corn of the poor farmers.”29
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Writing from Camargo, Lieutenant George B. McClellan made similar distinctions.  He
related that the Mexicans were “polite” to the regulars, while they “hated” the volunteers. 
He claimed never to have heard of a Mexican being murdered by a regular or vice versa. 
He described the volunteers’ behavior as “shameful and disgraceful.”  The volunteers, he
stated, “thought nothing of robbing and killing the Mexicans.”   Even though McClellan30
himself eventually succumbed to dishonest foraging (such as killing a “slow deer”), the
typical behavior of him and the other regulars was easily distinguished from that of the
volunteers serving in northern Mexico.  31
The journey from Matamoros to Monterrey covered 150 miles, most of it a barren
wilderness.  The transport of several thousand troops in such an environment required
careful preparations on the part of administrators, and the conservation of supplies by
soldiers.  Army regulars noted the general wastefulness and inefficient consumption of
the volunteers.  Meade blamed the shortage of provisions on both governmental short-
sightedness and the volunteers.  He described the volunteers as “some twenty thousand
men rushing into the country, who not only consumed supplies as fast as they arrived, but
had to be taken care of, as you would so many children.”   Too many volunteers had32
arrived too fast, creating a potential shortage of supplies.  This fact, combined with the
daunting overland trek to Monterrey, no doubt worried many army regulars and
administrators.
Regardless of any essential shortages, impatient volunteers demanded to move
forward.  They believed it nonsense to carry large quantities of supplies, and suggested
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living off the land.  This, of course, meant foraging the property of any civilians they
might meet between Camargo and Monterrey.  Many volunteers looked to the Texans as
model survivors.  In their numerous campaigns against the Mexicans, Texan soldiers
generally traveled without supply trains, depending solely upon hunting and foraging. 
Meade, however, did not hesitate to point out the futility of such operations.  He
attributed the Texans’ ultimate failure in subduing the Mexicans to what he called “badly
designed and worse executed forays.”  Ultimately, Meade blamed governmental short-
sightedness for the immediate problems the army faced.  Supply problems not only
threatened the army, but the Mexican civilians as well.  In times of need, volunteers often
did not hesitate to take from civilians what they had either squandered or not received
from the government.33
The American army was assembled and ready to leave Camargo on August 19,
1846.   Exactly one month later, a force of some six thousand volunteer and regular34
troops encamped twelve miles northeast of Monterrey at Agua Fria.   In his diary, army35
Lieutenant Rankin Dilworth chronicled the army’s journey to Monterrey.  As the army
entered Agua Fria, he noticed the rampant pillaging of the volunteers.   Taylor threatened36
to send home four volunteers arrested for attempting to break into a private residence.  37
A captured Mexican, presumed to be a spy and attempting escape, “got some distance
[before] a crowd got around him and beat his brains out.”   Dilworth does not specify the38
members of this “crowd,” but he mentions this incident alongside his previous accounts
of the volunteers’ misdeeds.  Such incidents as he witnessed at Agua Fria became
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commonplace after Monterrey’s surrender on September 25.                                        
The reputations of the volunteers preceded them.  Many residents of Monterrey
abandoned their homes immediately following the city’s capture; some hid in the general
vicinity of the city, while others relocated to Saltillo.   Meade blamed this fear on the39
volunteers, “[who] have made themselves so terrible by their previous outrages as to have
inspired the Mexicans with a perfect horror of them, and until [the Mexicans] are assured
of their security they will not return from their hiding places.”   A resident of Monterrey40
described the American regulars as “well-disciplined, subordinate, and under excellent
officers.”  The volunteers, on the contrary, were “unbridled...much like Comanches in
their appearance, ferocity, and customs.”    One observer noted that the departure of the41
Texas troops, which “caused the town to be more tranquil than ever,” did little to
encourage Monterrey’s residents to return because “they [were] yet afraid.”   42
Descriptions of Monterrey during the occupation vary.  Some observers chose to
downplay fear among the residents.  After the exit of Mexican troops from the city,
Thomas Bangs Thorpe, a notable author serving in the American army, noticed that
citizens returned to the streets and “opened their stores for traffic with the invaders.”  43
Thorpe described the scene at a church service, which took place only three weeks after
the battle, in which he found it “a curious spectacle to witness...veterans of our
army...now kneeling beside their enemies, acknowledging the same Supreme power, and
evincing that they were children of the same father.”   44
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Thorpe accused those citizens who left Monterrey, only to return later, of
succumbing to “a spirit of exaggeration.”  He could not understand why the residents had
so little faith in the Americans’ promise to protect them.  Thorpe went on to criticize what
he considered ungrateful behavior on the part of Mexicans.  Apparently, the Mexican
army, while occupying Monterrey, spread rumors concerning the conduct of the American
army.  Thorpe defended the Americans’ actions by noting their fair treatment of Mexican
wounded and captured, as well as their willingness to pay fair prices for the acquisition of
all private goods.  After invading Mexican territory and inflicting significant damage
upon Monterrey’s people and property, Thorpe failed to understand the natural
resentment of the conquered population.45
To prove his point, Thorpe included a letter in his narrative Our Army at
Monterey.  By sharing it, he hoped to expose what he considered Mexican propaganda
with regards to the American occupation; the letter, he stated, “illustrates this singular
feature of Mexican character.”  The author of the letter contradicted Thorpe on many
points.  He commented on the vandalism of the volunteers, and claimed that army
personnel forcibly occupied numerous houses throughout the city without paying any type
of rent or compensation.  Despite the assurances of Generals Zachary Taylor and William
J. Worth, American troops committed numerous outrages against persons and property,
and in many instances failed to respect the laws and religion of Mexico.  The author of
the letter blamed these depredations on the “unbridled volunteers, who, let loose upon the
whole city, commit excesses which decency and shame prevent me from specifying.”  As
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for the residents who fled Monterrey, he did not anticipate their return until the departure
of the volunteers.46
Meade  was confident that the army’s respectable behavior would encourage the
return of Monterrey’s inhabitants.  By limiting the number of military personnel permitted
within the city limits, army regulars initially maintained the peace and security of
Monterrey.  Liquor and gambling–considered to be the root causes of criminal
activity–were either prohibited or curtailed.  But despite the best efforts of army
administrators, the volunteers who managed to access Monterrey and the surrounding
areas created an atmosphere reminiscent of Matamoros and Camargo.47
Barely one week after the city’s capture, Monterrey Mayor Francisco P. Morales
sent this plea to Taylor:  “Multitudes of complaints have been made to this Government
against excesses committed upon persons and property against Mexicans daily by the
volunteers...and I am this moment informed that three of our citizens have been killed by
them...only because they possess the power to do so...”   Taylor promptly expressed his48
condolences to Morales, but explained the difficulty of controlling the volunteers.  He
acknowledged that “excesses have been committed,” but maintained that none were of
“grave character.”   Taylor promised to remove the volunteers from Monterrey within a49
few days, which he hoped would restore peace and order.50
A letter written from Monterrey by “an actor” further illustrates Taylor’s inability
to control his forces.  The actor attributed Taylor’s leniency to his desire to remain
popular with his troops, which he accomplished by neglecting any harsh forms of
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discipline or punishment.  According to the actor, guards were actually prohibited from
sending out patrols to enforce order within the city.  The result, as in Matamoros, was
murder, robbery, and rape–sometimes committed in open areas during daylight hours. 
Volunteers burned peasants’ huts, and a Texan murdered a Mexican soldier on a main
street in the middle of the day.  51
 The actor further deduced that these outrages, committed on helpless and
unoffending Mexicans, would ruin any chances for a successful and prompt termination
of the war.  He claimed that northern Mexico, on the eve of the war, was “ripe for revolt
and annexation to the United States.”  He blamed the volunteers for destroying any
possibility of American conciliation with civilians.  Many army regulars shared similar
concerns.  It was one thing for the volunteers to disregard military authority at home or
within the army, but quite another to expand this insubordination among a hostile
population, which in turn, threatened the safety and security of everyone involved.            52
            General William J. Worth, the American Military Governor of Monterrey,
supervised municipal regulation and military discipline within the city.  Lieutenant Daniel
Harvey Hill claimed that Worth, like Taylor, many times failed to enforce order during
the American occupation.  In addition to occurrences of rape and robbery, he estimated
that volunteers murdered one hundred inhabitants of Monterrey.  As a result of this,
Worth placed guards in front of selected buildings and throughout the city streets.  53
General John Ellis Wool expressed similar sentiments.  He spoke of  “deserters...and
dishonorably discharged soldiers” who committed “every species of atrocity on the
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defenseless inhabitants.”   He ordered his officers to “make all possible exertions to54
apprehend [these] villains and bring them to punishment.”   55
Meade accused the volunteers in Monterrey of creating such disturbances as to
prompt Taylor to action, even though Taylor many times did nothing to discipline
volunteers in such instances.  One particularly disturbing set of circumstances occurred
during the occupation.  An unknown regiment of volunteers forced themselves into a
house on the outskirts of Monterrey.  After forcibly removing the husband, the volunteers
proceeded to “commit outrages” on his wife.  Following this incident, a member of the
Kentucky Regiment was found dead, supposedly at the hands of the husband whose wife
had been raped.  Kentucky volunteers retaliated by murdering two Mexicans as they
worked in a cornfield.  This was followed by more murders on the part of Kentuckians
and Mexicans alike.  Ignoring Taylor’s strict orders–that no man should be allowed to go
out with arms–members of the Kentucky Regiment, in bands of twenty to thirty, left their
camps fully armed with intentions of killing Mexicans.  After two more shootings,
including the wounding of a twelve-year-old boy, Taylor took decisive action.  On this
particular occasion, he ordered  the First Kentucky “foot” to march in the rear of the
army, which apparently was a means of disgrace to both their unit and respective state. 
Meade, however, did not consider this punishment enough.  He would have preferred to
see the entire regiment disbanded and sent home “as a disgrace to the army and their
state.”56
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One observer described the same conflict as “the war between the Kentuckeyians
[sic] and the Mexicans.”  He claimed that volunteers killed forty Mexicans within five
days.  This observer acknowledged the atrocities committed by both sides, which had
commenced with the occupation of Matamoros and continued through the capture of
Monterrey.  He recognized a retributive system of justice, in which American retaliation
was generally “two for one.”  He further admitted that in many cases, innocents were
made to suffer for the crimes of the guilty.  The “war” between Kentucky volunteers and
Mexicans appeared to be the result of excessive atrocities and depredations on the part of
both sides, committed from the time of the arrival of the volunteers through the capture of
Monterrey.  Such incidents, which became almost commonplace in the long months
leading up to Monterrey’s capture, created tension that inevitably manifested itself in
numerous vicious acts during the city’s occupation.                             57
The volunteers’ careless behavior and negligence to health and hygiene caused
rampant sickness and death among them.   In some instances, their diseases affected the58
civilian population as well.  While stationed at Camargo in November 1846, Illinois
volunteer Thomas Tennery observed the corpse of a young Mexican boy who had
succumbed to measles.   He further noted that “[measles] are very fatal at present among59
the Mexican children, who have caught them from the soldiers.”   Three months earlier,60
Lieutenant Napoleon Dana noticed an epidemic among the Mexican infants of Camargo. 
He attributed this widespread mortality to whooping cough.  Dana did not say if the
American troops were responsible for the spread of this sickness.  However, he noted that
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many of the babies had died since the army’s arrival.   Throughout the summer and fall61
of 1846, both the volunteers and residents of Camargo suffered greatly from the ravages
of sickness and disease.                  
Because they lacked proper military discipline and survival skills, volunteers often
wasted food and other provisions.  As a result of this (or many times regardless of this),
Meade stated that the volunteers “plunder the poor inhabitants of everything...and shoot
them when they remonstrate...making us a terror to innocent people.”   Drunkenness62
often led to fights, and when volunteers were killed in such instances, their respective
units retaliated with wanton murder and cruelty.  Much of this was due to volunteer
officers’ inability to control their subordinates.   The unnamed actor from Monterrey63
recounted an “unsoldierly” scene in which volunteers chased their commanding officer
through his own camp.   While such a scene may seem comical, this blatant disregard for64
authority exemplified the larger problem facing the volunteer units in northern Mexico. 
This lack of discipline directly affected the volunteers’ ability to care for themselves
properly, and further, created an increasingly hostile atmosphere among the civilian
population.  The consequences were this:  the wastefulness and misbehavior of volunteers
placed an undue burden upon both the army regulars and the civilian population of
northen Mexico.
Returning to Matamoros several months after Monterrey’s capture, S. Compton
Smith contrasted the devastation and destruction of the countryside with his initial
passage through the same area.  Upon his first visit to the village of Puntiaguda (en route
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to Monterrey), he described a place containing fifteen hundred rancheros, all of whom
welcomed the Americans and provided the army with necessary provisions.  A few
months after Smith’s initial passage, however, Ohio volunteers led by Colonel Samuel
Ryan Curtis destroyed the village in retaliation for guerrilla harassment of American
supply trains.  In relation the crimes of guerrillas, Smith was confident that the people of
Puntiaguda were entirely innocent.  He claimed that the Ohioans, on their passage to
Monterrey, destroyed crops and burned villages and ranches.  “Such are the horrors of
war,” concluded Smith.  “The innocent and friendly peasantry are often made to suffer its
penalties.”65
The incident to which Smith most likely referred happened on March 1, 1847, as
recorded in Curtis’s diary.  On that day, Curtis ordered the removal of some huts, which
he believed to interfere with the duties of his pickets.   He explained that an officer set66
one of these huts on fire, which appeared to initiate a chain reaction.  Another officer
ignited twelve more huts, and before Curtis could regain control of the situation, more
than one hundred were completely destroyed.  Curtis lamented the consequences by
stating that “the town is now, indeed a widespread ruin...the silly and wicked distinction
of property must exasperate the Mexicans.”             67
Samuel Chamberlain claimed that by the summer of 1847, the entire area between
Monterrey and Camargo was depopulated as the result of a vicious guerrilla war.  He
pointed out that both sides involved were equally guilty of creating and sustaining a
conflict that was “no longer war but murder.”  “Our officers became disgusted,”
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Chamberlain concluded, “with the many revolting acts committed by volunteers and
Rangers, and no reports were ever made of these cruel raids.”   Taylor likewise reported68
that during his campaign, many of the volunteers “committed extensive depredations and
outrages upon the peaceful inhabitants” and that “there is scarcely a form of crime that
has not been reported to me as committed by them.”   But by this time, the need for69
volunteers in northern Mexico had passed, and with their departure returned a semblance
of normality.   
Obviously, it is impossible to determine  the actual extent of civilian atrocities
committed by the volunteers who served under Taylor in northern Mexico.  But the
accounts of army regulars, casual observers, and the volunteers themselves attest to the
commonality of such incidents, especially during the first year of the war.  In Army of
Manifest Destiny, James M. McCaffrey concludes that “American soldiery during the
Mexican War was not very different from the volunteer soldiers throughout American
history...they viewed the enemy as being on a lower plane, and they therefore found it
easier to hate and to kill in far-off Mexico.”   One can only speculate as to how the70
volunteers’ treatment of civilians compared to that of other nineteenth-century armies. 
One Mexican observer, noting the volunteers’ incredible appetite for both food and
liquor, commented that their behavior consisted of “mingled barbarism and restraint.”  71
Any “restraint,” however, did little to quell the overall rebellious nature of the Mexican
War volunteer.  Regardless of any comparisons to soldiers in general, the fact remains
that the behavior of American volunteers serving in northern Mexico had a detrimental
59
effect upon the lives of numerous civilians.  For the United States Army, at least initially,
it seemed in many instances that the benefits (or the actual necessity) of having volunteer
units were overshadowed by the disruptions their presence created in northern Mexico.      
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CHAPTER IV
RACKENSACKERS AND THE CENTRAL DIVISION
For Samuel Chamberlain, Christmas 1846 was anything but uneventful.  His
company of dragoons were stationed at Agua Nueva, a cattle ranch seventeen miles south
of Saltillo and near the site of the future battle of Buena Vista.  On Christmas Day,
Chamberlain and his comrades prepared an elaborate holiday meal for the regulars in
camp.  Just as they prepared to eat, a mounted Texas Ranger rode through the camp,
signaling the approach of the Mexican army.  Chamberlain’s dragoons, along with the
infantry and artillery, promptly prepared for battle.  No sooner had the order been given to
march, than Chamberlain witnessed an unruly mob of volunteers descending upon his
precious meal.  The regulars, now confined to their ranks, watched helplessly as the
volunteers consumed their entire Christmas dinner.  Chamberlain bitterly lamented the
injustice  of  “regulars [being] robbed of their dinner by volunteers!”   However traumatic1
the circumstances, the regulars maintained order and marched toward their picket lines,
only to be met by a gang of “Rackensackers.”   Observing a cloud of dust in the distance,2
an Arkansas officer claimed to have frightened the enemy into retreat.  However, further
observation revealed the source of dust–a herd of wild mustangs.  “Cursing all
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volunteers,” Chamberlain and his fellow dragoons returned to their camp for a Christmas
dinner of hard bread and salt pork.3
Chamberlain’s Christmas story might be considered just another one of his
amusing anecdotes were it not for what he witnessed en route to meet the “enemy.” 
Passing the Agua Nueva Ranch, the regulars found the place overrun by volunteers, who
were “committing all manner of outrages on the few women left in the ranch, fighting
over their poor victims like dogs.”  Chamberlain and his fellow dragoons literally
attacked the volunteers with swords and drove them away.  After placing the
women–some of whom were stripped naked–in a carefully-guarded house, the dragoons
resumed their march to the sight of the false alarm.  Certainly, Chamberlain viewed the
incident at Agua Nueva with horror, but he also seemed to welcome it as an opportunity
to avenge the volunteers for their raid on his Christmas dinner.4
Chamberlain’s memoirs introduce the reader to the Arkansas volunteers, whom he
refers to on numerous occasions as “Rackensackers.”  The previously mentioned account
was only one in a long series of atrocious acts committed by volunteers from Arkansas. 
Chamberlain accompanied the Central Division, also known as the Army of Chihuahua
(even though they never reached Chihuahua), from San Antonio to Saltillo, Mexico. 
Throughout the journey, Chamberlain was often absent from the main army due to his
duties as forager, dispatcher, and scout.   However, he spent enough time with the5
Rackensackers to confirm their notorious reputation.
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In his genealogical study Arkansas’ Mexican
War Soldiers, Desmond Walls Allen lists a total of
1,552 Arkansans who served in the war, all of whom
comprised eighteen companies.   Ten of these6
companies formed the Arkansas Regiment of
Mounted Volunteers, who were commanded by
Colonel Archibald Yell.   Yell’s companies were7
notorious for their unruly behavior.  General John
Ellis Wool, commander of the Central Division,
contemptuously referred to them on occasion as
“Colonel Yell’s Mounted Devils.”   Their blatant8
insubordination resulted in numerous depredations
committed against the inhabitants of northern Mexico. 
Prior to the war, Archibald Yell served as both governor and congressman in
Arkansas.  After his death at the Battle of Buena Vista, a Little Rock newspaper printed a
lengthy obituary.   The obituary states that as a member of Congress, Yell was a9
prominent advocate of the admission of Texas and asserted the United States’ right to the
Oregon Territory.  In addition, he was among the “fast and reliable friends of the
administration, and was honored in a high degree with the confidence of the President...he
was for a vigorous prosecution of the war.”  This statement identified Yell as an
expansionist-minded member of the Democratic Party, and most likely an ardent defender
Figure 6 Colonel Archibald Yell
commanded Arkansas’s “Mounted
Devils.”  Fay Hemstead, A Pictorial
History of Arkansas from Earliest
Times to the Year 1890 (New York:  N.
D. Thompson, 1890).   
 
68
of southern interests.  His obituary concludes:  “When the news reached Washington that
the Mexicans had dared to cross the Rio Grande, and spill the blood of our citizens upon
their own soil, he was among the most active in bringing forward measures...to drive
them from our soil and punish their insolence.”  Throughout the war, Yell and his
Mounted Devils “vigorously prosecuted the war” by punishing Mexican soldiers and
civilians alike for this apparent “insolence.”                        10
The Arkansans’ motivations for volunteer service bear some similarities to those
of the Texas Rangers.  No doubt one of the first casualties of the war affected the
mentalities of many Arkansas volunteers.  On May 6, 1846, during the Mexican siege of
Fort Texas, Major Jacob Brown of Arkansas was mortally wounded.   General Zachary11
Taylor later renamed the garrison Fort Brown in honor of this fallen hero.  
Taylor and his army first arrived at the Rio Grande, across from Matamoros, on
April 10, 1846.   On May 1, Taylor and his main force departed Fort Texas for Point12
Isabel to secure the American supply line and also to obtain necessary provisions.   Upon13
the army’s departure, Major Brown assumed command of the fort.  A few days later, on
May 3, the Mexican siege of Fort Texas began.   The siege continued until May 8, two14
days after Brown’s death.  After the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma (May 8-
9), Taylor’s army crossed the Rio Grande and settled into the newly-occupied city of
Matamoros.   Although most Arkansas volunteers reported to San Antonio several15
months after these events, the memory of Brown’s death and the circumstances
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surrounding it created a desire for vengeance among them.   These motivations–although16
existing to a lesser degree–were similar to those of the Texas Rangers.
The Arkansans were greatly  influenced by the patriotic fervor that swept over the
United States.  They volunteered in great numbers; quotas were rapidly filled, and many
prospective recruits were turned away.   At a farewell ceremony in Little Rock,17
Josephine Buckner and Judith Field presented two volunteer companies with flags
inscribed “Up guards and at ‘em” and “Extend the area of freedom.”  Buckner presented
her flag with these words:  “When on the weary march, or in the thick of the fight you
will look unto your standard, let it serve to remind you of home and all its
associations...think of parents and children, wives and relatives who watch with trembling
anxiety, ready to weep for your fall, or exult in your fame!”  Field expressed her
patriotism by expressing her desire to fight alongside the “stoutest warriors.”  This
jubilant atmosphere further encouraged the Arkansans to join the war effort for state pride
and visions of military glory.18
The Central Division, including 417 Arkansas volunteers, departed San Antonio
on September 26, 1846.   Before entering Mexican territory, General John Ellis Wool19
announced the United States Army’s conciliatory objectives to his troops.  He stressed the
importance of distinguishing between enemy troops and the native inhabitants.  His
overall policy promised that “[those] who do not take up arms against the United
States...will not be molested or interfered with, either as regards their persons or
property...and whatever is received from them will be liberally paid for.”  Wool
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threatened severe punishment on anyone violating this ordinance.  Despite this stern
warning, the volunteers accompanying the Central Division inflicted numerous atrocities
upon the inhabitants of northern Mexico.20
Throughout his Narrative of the Central Division, Arkansas private Jonathon W.
Buhoup refused to record the names and identities of those who committed atrocities and
depredations against Mexican civilians.  Such incidents occurred from the very beginning
of the campaign.  In one outrageous story, an individual referred to by Buhoup as an
“Indian,” stole a Mexican mayor’s blanket.   The story is significant not so much for the21
deed itself, but for Buhoup’s introduction of the term “Indian.”  By blaming all of the
ensuing war crimes on an unnamed Indian, Buhoup successfully related the realities of
military and civilian interactions to his audience while protecting the reputations of
Arkansas volunteers (and perhaps himself).  The Indian’s motto was this:  “Anything is
fair in war.”22
In A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair, Paul Foos comes to similar conclusions.  He
accuses Buhoup of presenting the widespread atrocities of Arkansas volunteers in a
deliberately veiled manner.  He asserts that Buhoup expressed this undesirable behavior
in racial terms.  For example, any volunteer guilty of theft and violence was referred to as
the “Indian.”  Foos suggests that this Indian may have been either a composite of
individuals or the alter ego of Buhoup.  This theory is justified by the fact that Buhoup
related so many crimes in remarkable detail.  Beyond this, he also provided elaborate
justification for such behavior.  Foos concludes that Buhoup’s use of racial stereotypes 
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Figure 7  The Arkansas volunteers spent considerable time in the areas surrounding Saltillo.  K. Jack
Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846-1848 (New York:  Macmillan, 1974). 
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made it possible for the narrator to separate “the ‘white’ or noble aspects of his peers
from the ignoble behavior that accompanied the regiment from San Antonio to Saltillo.”  23
         The Arkansans showed little regard for civilian property or possessions.  Two
weeks after Wool’s decree, the volunteers entered San Rosalia and raided a field of sugar
cane.   A few days prior, unnamed Americans robbed and severely beat four Mexicans. 24
Buhoup was “pretty confident” they were not volunteers, and claimed he would have
named the perpetrators if he had such knowledge.   Officers committed similar offenses. 25
One particular officer stole a valuable gourd owned by an elderly Mexican lady.  26
Buhoup refused to release the individual’s name, thus protecting the reputation of the
unit.  
Outside San Rosalia, American soldiers mistook a civilian camp for that of the
Mexican army.  The camp was actually a group of Mexican traders, transporting cartloads
of apples into town.   However, this discovery did little to dissuade the volunteers from
“unceremoniously charging” the small wagon train.  In the absence of Wool, moneyless
volunteers “did not exactly steal [the apples],” but “mustered them into service.”  Buhoup
blamed this blatant robbery on “our Native American friend.”  In one instance, the
Mexicans charged soldiers who were willing to pay in excess of twelve cents for three
apples.  Such unfair pricing, in Buhoup’s opinion, justified this seizure of Mexican goods. 
He hoped that this logic would persuade his readers to overlook the Rackensackers’
behavior.27
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The Central Division reached Monclova on October 31, 1846.  A few miles from
the city, Wool met with the mayor of the city.  Wool requested the formal surrender of
both the city and all public property.  In addition, Wool held the mayor responsible for the
“good behavior” of the Mexicans.  The mayor consented to Wool’s demands, or as
Buhoup explained, “[he] agreed, or rather had to agree.”  However, Wool’s penchant for
discipline–from the conquered Mexicans and his own troops–ultimately failed to contain
the actions of certain volunteers.      28
Before entering Monclova, Buhoup observed his Indian friend in possession of a
freshly killed kid goat.  Upon inquiry, the Indian explained that he wanted to empty his
gun without needlessly wasting the cartridge, so he “tried [his] sight on this young goat.” 
Although not condoning such behavior, Buhoup and his comrades were more than willing
to help the Indian partake of the meat.  In most of his Indian stories, Buhoup tended to
frown upon the questionable behavior while freely sharing in any material gain that
resulted.  Most likely, this was the means by which Buhoup and his comrades justified
any atrocities that they committed throughout the campaign.29
After Wool established himself within Monclova, he appointed two companies of
Illinois volunteers to enforce his orders.  Despite these measures, American soldiers
freely stole from the local merchants.  As previously mentioned, money was in short
supply, especially among volunteer units.  Due to what Buhoup described as exorbitant
prices, he explained that “some of the boys were compelled to adopt the old mode of
mustering into service.”  Judging from the actions of his Indian friend, it appears that the
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volunteers in Monclova managed to secure a wide variety of delicacies without purchase. 
Buhoup’s Indian was said to ambush unfortunate residents under the cover of darkness,
thereby avoiding detection by the authorities.  Buhoup’s main justification for such
blatant thievery seemed to be related to his belief that Mexican merchants took advantage
of desperate troops by overcharging for essential goods.  In any case, it appears that
Mexican merchants were among the first residents of Monclova to suffer at the hands of
volunteers and other American troops.30
On November 3, victorious American troops paraded through the streets of
Monclova en route to their new camp a mile outside the city.  This elaborate display of
military pomp allowed the Mexicans and Americans to see one another in close
proximity.  Buhoup marveled at the beauty of the town’s cathedrals and plazas. 
Departing town, the troops made their way across a barren landscape, devoid of
significant vegetation.  Before reaching the new camp, they discovered a grove of young
cottonwood and fig trees.  In need of firewood, the volunteers descended upon the grove
and proceeded to destroy several trees.  These particular trees, however, had been planted
by Mexicans, and therefore, were considered private property.  Wool paid $400 in
reparation, and required the purchase of all wood in the future.  The troops now depended
upon Mexican merchants, who transported the wood overland a distance of ten miles. 
Scarce money and high prices caused resentful troops to quarrel with their suppliers.  This
was remedied, according to Buhoup, by depending upon the Indian.31
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Members of the Central Division suffered daily from a lack of money, provisions,
and other such essentials.  They were also eager to engage the enemy.  These
circumstances at times caused the Arkansans to react impulsively to any perceived
dangers or threats.  On one such occasion, a rumor circulated that Mexicans held several
American prisoners in a nearby ranch.  Enraged volunteers began destroying the ranch’s
buildings.  The interference of some regular officers prevented what Buhoup described as
a potentially “awful catastrophe.”  Unfortunately, extensive damage was already done;
any destroyed buildings served to satisfy the volunteers’ need for firewood.  In another
instance, the owner of a hacienda invited American officers to join him for a glass of
wine.  However, his invitation did not extend to the volunteers present.  The volunteers
viewed their exclusion as an insult, and “some very hard remarks were made concerning
him.”  Buhoup’s Indian friend stated that the hacienda owner might find some of his
sheep or goats missing.  Apparently this came to pass, as Buhoup explained that the
Indian “was generally a man of his word.”32
Mexican prisoners of war were not safe around Arkansas volunteers.  Samuel
Chamberlain recalled a scouting expedition that resulted in the capture of seventy enemy
soldiers.  He and his comrades tied the prisoners to horses and escorted them to the
army’s camp at Monclova.  Nearing the town, a volunteer regiment of Arkansas Cavalry
surrounded the pack train and threatened harm to the captured Mexicans.  As
Chamberlain explained, “Their officers had no control over them, and only our bold front
saved our defenseless prisoners from being massacred.”  But Chamberlain’s party could
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do little to defend anyone else coming in contact with the overenthusiastic
Rackensackers.  Unable to wreak vengeance on Chamberlain’s prisoners, they went
elsewhere.  Upon their departure, Chamberlain commented, “Woe to the cripples and sick
women who fell in their way, for their cruelty was only exceeded by their
insubordination.”  From this account, it does not appear that the Arkansans necessarily
distinguished between able-bodied men and women and children.33
The Arkansans’ behavior were in many ways attributable to their racist attitudes
and feelings of southern superiority.  Chamberlain described them as “wild and reckless
young fellows...many of them duelists and desperadoes of the frontier...to whom the
wholesome restraints of discipline seemed tyranny in its worst form...[who] while in
camp were a perfect nuisance.”  According to Chamberlain, the Arkansans regularly
raided local ranches, committing all manner of outrages on the inhabitants.  This made
extra work for the army’s dragoons, who were required to patrol the countryside and
protect the civilians from the misdeeds of these volunteers.  The Arkansans referred to the
Mexicans as “greasers.”  In Chamberlain’s opinion, the Arkansans’ viewed “the
‘greasers’ as belonging to the same social class as their own Negro slaves,” and as a
result, “they plundered and ill-treated them.”   34
The commander of the Arkansas Cavalry, Colonel Archibald Yell, did little to
restrain his volunteers; neither did he care to receive advice nor orders from General
Wool.   Part of this had to do with Yell’s status as ex-governor of Arkansas.  Concerning
the behavior of Arkansas volunteers, Chamberlain commented that “this shameful state of
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affairs seemed to have no remedy; the war was a southern democratic one, and ex-
Governor Yell of the great and sovereign state of Arkansas...[was] of too much
importance to take advice, much less orders, from a little Yankee general like Wool.”  35
Wool described the Arkansans as being “wholly without instruction,” which he attributed
to Yell’s “[determination] to leave [them] in that condition.”  Yell, he concluded, had a
“total ignorance of his duties as Colonel.”                36
The worst atrocity of the Mexican War directly involved Arkansas volunteers. 
Chamberlain devoted an entire chapter of his memoirs to the “Massacre of the Cave.”  37
In mid February, Chamberlain, accompanying Wool’s escort, was returning to Saltillo
from a trip to the Encantada Ranch.  Hearing the discharge of firearms in the nearby
mountains, Wool’s entourage followed the reports, fully expecting to engage the enemy.  38
Steep terrain caused the party to dismount and continue on foot.  Soon after this,
Chamberlain encountered a wounded Mexican; not only was he shot, but viciously
scalped as well.  Following the sounds of “shouts and curses, cries of women and
children,” the group came upon the entrance to a cave.  What Chamberlain recorded next
seems beyond belief.  He claimed that the cave was full of volunteers, mostly Arkansans,
murdering Mexican civilians indiscriminately.  Chamberlain guessed as many as twenty
Mexicans lay murdered on the floor of the cave, most of them scalped.39
Chamberlain’s party surrounded the Arkansans, and at gunpoint, ordered the
massacre to cease.  Army regulars escorted the perpetrators back to camp where they were
held prisoner.  Chamberlain and several army surgeons returned to the cave in an attempt
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to save any Mexicans left alive.  They found a most tragic scene–women and children
sobbing and wounded men groaning.  Those still alive panicked at Chamberlain’s return;
they assumed that he and the others had returned to “finish the work.”40
Buhoup gave a less detailed account of this event.  He believed most of the
correspondence surrounding the massacre to be exaggeration.  Quoting Captain Crow of
the Illinois volunteers, Buhoup estimated the number murdered to be between twenty-five
and thirty.  In reference to women and children, he stated, “We do not think that during
the whole march of the Central Division, anyone belonging to it ever heard of a woman or
child being murdered.”  “If such atrocities were committed,” he continued, “no one is the
wiser of it.”  However, Buhoup failed to comment on the status of the men
killed–whether or not they were armed or guilty of any crimes against the Arkansans.41
Figure 8 Chamberlain’s painting of the “Massacre of the Cave.”  Samuel Chamberlain, My Confession
(New York:  Harper & Brothers, 1956).
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Many years after the war, an Arkansas volunteer related a similar story in his
memoirs.  He claimed that Mexicans regularly lassoed and dragged to death American
soldiers.  Such was the fate of a lone Arkansas rider in early 1847.  In retaliation, several
Arkansas volunteers “got permits to go deer hunting...and [finding] a camp of Mexicans
and believing them to be the guilty ones, they shot all, about seventy-five in number.” 
The narrator claimed that many of the Mexicans fell to their knees and begged for mercy. 
Although he does not mention anything about a cave, this account –with the exception of
an exaggerated number of victims–bears striking resemblance to Chamberlain’s
“Massacre of the Cave.”    42
Wool formally reprimanded the Arkansas Cavalry, but Chamberlain claimed that
no individual received any direct punishment.  The event that sparked this incident was
the murder of an Arkansas volunteer.  However, Chamberlain concluded that this murder
was directly related to the events at the Agua Nueva Ranch on Christmas Day.  In
retaliation for the rampant rape of numerous women at Agua Nueva, Mexican men
murdered an Arkansas volunteer, thus prompting the Arkansans’ retaliation that resulted
in the cave massacre.  Both incidents prove that retaliatory actions among civilians and
volunteers were quite common, often resulting in horrific actions on the part of both
sides.  However, if Chamberlain’s accounts of the occurrences at Agua Nueva and the
cave are accurate, it appears that the actions of the volunteers many times exceeded mere
retaliation.        43
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Word of the massacre reached General Taylor, and he initiated a court of inquiry
into the matter.  However, the testimony of witnesses failed to identify any specific
individual participating in the incident.  Taylor’s only option was to punish the entire
Arkansas Regiment, which never happened.  By claiming ignorance, the volunteers
successfully withheld the identities of the guilty parties, thus rendering Taylor helpless in
his attempt to administer justice.  Buhoup believed that “anyone who had seen the
murdered man, and could not feel himself inspired with the feelings of revenge, was not
the man qualified to be in Mexico.”  To him, the brutal murder of an Arkansas volunteer
necessitated an equally vicious act of revenge.  The Arkansas volunteers, similar to the
Texas Rangers and other volunteer groups, found ways to avoid military discipline, and
thus, were free to conduct their own form of justice upon the civilian population of
northern Mexico.                                                             44
The American victory at Buena Vista did little to curb the rampant plundering and
foraging of Arkansas volunteers.  The two-day battle (February 22-23, 1847) had taken its
toll on volunteers and regulars alike.  Short on such essentials as coffee and fresh meat,
Buhoup related the following story as a type of Biblical analogy:   “Suddenly, as if
providentially sent, like quails to the Israelites, a drove of sheep came running into the
camp.  It is needless to say that without ceremony the sheep were dispatched, and not one
remained or escaped.”  Buhoup failed to mention the Indian in this case; perhaps he
expected the reader to sympathize with the needs of soldiers who endured the recent
hardships of battle.45
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After Buena Vista, most of the Arkansas regiments posted at the ranch of
Encantada.  Here they amused themselves with horse racing and gambling.  It is here that
Buhoup’s Indian reappeared, engaging himself in the capture of  “stray” horses and
mules.  He was able to profit by selling the captured animals to foot soldiers at bargain
prices.  Mexican ranchers countered this by matching their branding irons with that of the
brand on the horse in question.  When this occurred, American officials returned the
stolen animals to their rightful owners and sentenced the Indian to several days in the
guard-house.  However, the Indian remedied this situation by creating his own branding
iron, which he then used to alter the mark on stolen animals, thus confusing the rightful
owners.46
On May 31, 1847, the Arkansans participated in one final massacre.  Two
Mexicans stabbed an unsuspecting Arkansas cavalryman as he rode past them.  The
murderers threw the wounded man in a ditch and stole his horse.  The wounded Arkansan
lived long enough to explain the event to his companions, who promptly captured the
members of the guilty party.  The Arkansans suspicions were confirmed when they found
one of the Mexicans in possession of the murder weapon.  After executing the murderers,
the Arkansans spent the day killing Mexicans, regardless of any crimes committed.  An
unknown witness guessed the Arkansans killed seventeen.   Commenting on this matter,47
Ohio volunteer Samuel Ryan Curtis hoped that in the future, the Arkansans would “cease
to seek indiscriminate or doubtful vengeance.”   Curtis’s wish soon came true; on June 5,48
1847, the last Arkansas volunteers departed Saltillo and headed for home.                       49
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On June 22, 1847, the Arkansas regiments received their final pay and left
Camargo for Reynosa.  Having reached the end of a long journey, Buhoup and his
comrades bid good-bye to the Indian.  When asked of his reasons for staying, the Indian
simply replied, “Great country, this.”  Buhoup concluded:  “We do not know what his
intentions were, but we think, should he commit any depredations on the Mexicans while
not belonging to any corps, General Wool will skeer an Injin [sic] very bad.”  50
Discharged volunteers, free of army discipline, would have been at liberty to commit any
depredations they saw fit.  Discharged volunteers either found employment with the army
or opened their own small businesses.   If any members of the Central Division chose to51
return to Saltillo, they did so at the risk of being attacked by the guerrillas or irregular
Mexican troops who wandered the countryside during the summer of 1847.  But if the
account of the Indian is true, it proves that some were willing to take this risk.
Of all the volunteer units that served in the Mexican War, only the Texas Rangers
exceeded the Arkansans in the number of atrocities and depredations committed against
the civilians of northern Mexico.   Like most volunteer units, the Rackensackers were52
caught up in the patriotic fervor associated with the spirit of Manifest Destiny.  As
previously mentioned, the death of Major Jacob Brown at Fort Texas early in the war
created a martyr who inspired many Arkansans to volunteer for service.  The
Rackensackers came from a frontier slave state; this, no doubt, contributed to their
contempt for anyone they considered their inferiors–in this instance, the Mexicans.   In53
addition to racism, attitudes of state sovereignty and southern superiority influenced their
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behavior as well.   Finally, volunteer officers such as Colonel Archibald Yell fostered54
attitudes of insubordination among their troops.  The officers’ unwillingness or inability
to control their respective volunteers created an environment hostile to military discipline,
which resulted in needless acts of violence directed at the civilians of northern Mexico.
But beyond any other possible reasons for their behaviors, the Arkansans appeared
to commit atrocities for the same reasons other volunteer units did.  In times of need, the
Arkansans did not hesitate to steal what they needed from locals.  They raped Mexican
women, as witnessed by Samuel Chamberlain on Christmas Day, 1846.  However, the
Arkansans’ acts of murder probably do more to explain the reasons for their behavior
than anything else.  When a Mexican murdered an Arkansan, the Rackensackers were
sure to seek retribution.  In this sense, the Arkansans differed little from the Texas
Rangers.  The main difference, of course, was the fact that the Texans had a long history
of retaliatory actions against the Mexicans.  But none the less, when the Arkansans finally
reached Mexico, and were placed in similar circumstances, they lashed back at the
civilian inhabitants with equal fury; or at times exceeded such, as evidenced by the
“Massacre of the Cave.” 
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The Mexican War volunteers inflicted great suffering upon the inhabitants of
northern Mexico throughout the war.  Overall, their presence had a significantly adverse
effect upon the civilian population.  In terms of individual groups, the Texas Rangers and
the Arkansas volunteers seemed to commit more civilian depredations than any others. 
The cruelty of their acts also exceeded that of other volunteer units.  The Arkansans’
“Massacre of the Cave” and the Rangers’ attack on the San Francisco Ranch provide
solid evidence for such a conclusion.   An examination of General Zachary Taylor’s1
northern campaign, however, proves that civilian atrocities were not only common, but
committed by volunteers other than those previously mentioned.  Civilian atrocities were
widespread and resulted from the insubordination and lack of discipline–throughout the
entire war–on the part of numerous volunteers from many different units.                 
There are two main reasons for the misbehavior of the volunteers.  First, they were
not required to adhere to the strict military discipline imposed upon army regulars.  This
military discipline, which promoted conciliation and proper treatment of Mexican
civilians and non-combatants, was absent from most volunteer units.  The volunteers’
refusal to model their behavior after army regulars created a noticeable rift in the army. 
Civilians especially took note of this, and learned to fear and despise Mexican War
89
volunteers.  Second, continuous harassment from guerrillas and irregular Mexican troops
created frustrations among American volunteers that most often resulted in retaliatory
actions.  In many instances, Mexican civilians and non-combatants found themselves in
the midst of a conflict that they neither wished nor asked for. 
In his book To Conquer a Peace, author John Edward Weems deduces that “many
[Mexican War] volunteers had joined the army for fun and frolic more than for fighting,
and their revelry got out of hand.  Their own officers were reluctant to discipline them for
fear of reprisal later, upon return to civilian life; for all personnel in volunteer regiments
came from the same localities.”   That is a valid conclusion.  Mexican War volunteers2
were not prepared for a war in a foreign land.  Patriotism and the spirit of Manifest
Destiny encouraged many to join in the war effort, but beyond this, the Mexican War also
provided volunteers with an opportunity for excitement and adventure.  When their
patriotic fervor and quest for adventure subsided, they looked to other sources to satisfy
their desires.  Boredom, alcohol abuse, supply shortages, the unwarranted murder of
comrades, and feelings of desperation caused volunteers to commit numerous injustices
against the civilians of northern Mexico.  When such things occurred, volunteer officers
refused to take disciplinary action for fear of reprisal.  This explains why atrocities
became prevalent among the volunteers.  They were accountable to no one except
themselves and their comrades.  Their loyalty to their home states and respective units
took precedence over the army’s mission and created problems with regard to discipline
and unity.  This insubordination–which inevitably extended into the civilian sector–had a
90
detrimental effect on the inhabitants of northern Mexico, who suffered greatly due to the
presence of volunteers.  It is safe to assume that many Mexicans–long after the
culmination of this brief conflict–remembered and resented the conquest of northern
Mexico, and that their lives were never quite the same.
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1.  Samuel E. Chamberlain, My Confession, with an introduction and postscript by Roger
Butterfield (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 87, 177.  In both of these incidents,
Chamberlain guessed that volunteers murdered some twenty to thirty Mexican civilians.    
2.  John Edward Weems, To Conquer a Peace:  The War between the United States and
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